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A B S T R A C T
Mitigating climate change will require integrating large amounts of highly intermittent renewable energy
(RE) sources in future electricity markets. Considerable uncertainties exist about the cost and availability
of future large-scale storage to alleviate the potential mismatch between demand and supply. This paper
examines the suitability of regulatory (public policy) mechanisms for coping with the volatility induced by
intermittent RE sources, using a numerical equilibrium model of a future wholesale electricity market. We
ﬁnd that the optimal RE subsidies are technology-speciﬁc reﬂecting the heterogeneous value for system
integration. Differentiated RE subsidies reduce the curtailment of excess production, thereby preventing
costly investments in energy storage. Using a simple cost-beneﬁt framework, we show that a smart design
of RE support policies signiﬁcantly reduces the level of optimal storage. We further ﬁnd that the marginal
beneﬁts of storage rapidly decrease for short-term (intra-day) storage and are small for long-term (seasonal)
storage independent of the storage level. This suggests that storage is not likely to be the limiting factor for
decarbonizing the electricity sector.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The combat against climate change requires to substantially
reduce worldwide carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the electricity
sector over the next decades by profoundly shifting energy supply
towards renewable energy (RE) sources. At the global level, the
required share of electricity coming from RE sources to restrict
global warming to 1.5 ◦C is estimated to be between 70% and 81%
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by 2050 (IPCC, 2018). For Europe, the European Commission’s (2011)
Energy Roadmap 2050 foresees RE shares as high as 64% to 97%
to be consistent with EU climate policy targets. Such high amounts
of energy supplied from RE sources pose signiﬁcant challenges to
existing energy systems as the economically most viable and carbon-
free RE technologies (i.e., wind and solar) are highly volatile in their
output.
Fig. 1 shows the temporal variation of electricity demand and
resource availability of wind and solar over the course of a day
(Panel a) and a year (Panel b). It serves to illustrate the well-known
and fundamental issue which also motivates our analysis: a future
low-carbon energy system which relies on a large share of volatile
RE energy will likely face the challenge of substantial periodic mis-
matches between energy demand and supply. To cope with the high
volatility of daily and seasonal resource availability, a mechanism is
needed to shift supplybetweenhours of thedayandpossiblybetween
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.07.023
0140-9883/© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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(a) By hour over a day. (b) By month over a year.
Fig. 1. Hourly variation of electricity demand, wind generation, and solar generation. Notes: Resource availability is measured in percentage terms relative to the maximum
electricity generation that would be possible under ideal conditions for solar and wind. “By hour over a day” shows the hourly values for each variable averaged over the whole
year. “By month over a year” shows the hourly values for each variable averaged for a given month. Electricity demand is based on data for the German electricity market in 2014
taken from ENTSO-E (2016). Resource availability for wind and solar is calculated as observed market production for a given hour relative to nominally installed capacities based
on data from German transmission system operators (50Hertz, 2018; Amprion, 2018; Tennet, 2018; TransnetBW, 2018).
seasons (for example, by either shifting solar generation from day to
night or from summer to winter, or wind generation from off-peak
to peak hours).1
Much of the academic literature and ongoing discussions among
policymakers have focused on the question how energy storage
can serve as a buffering mechanism to cope with the volatility and
system integration costs induced by intermittent RE sources (Hirth,
2015; Gowrisankaran et al., 2016; Sinn, 2017; Zerrahn et al., 2018).
At the same time, there are considerable uncertainties as well as
concerns about the costs, availability, and potentials of future storage
technologies, in particularwhen deployed at the large scales required
for deep decarbonization.2
Instead of focusing on a pure technological solution for buffer-
ing volatility (i.e., through energy storage), this paper examines the
suitability of a regulatory or public policy mechanism as a means for
coping with the impacts of large shares of highly volatile RE sources
in future energy systems: the design of technology-speciﬁc RE sup-
port schemes. Speciﬁcally, we ask to what extent the economic cost
of integrating a large amount of highly volatile wind and solar energy
can be reduced bymodifying the design of RE support schemes—such
as subsidies on output or investment—to take into account the het-
erogeneous value of different RE technologies with respect to system
integrationcosts. Currentpolicyapproaches tend to favor technology-
neutral support schemes. A recent example are German joint tenders
for wind and solar energy, the last of which saw a dominance of solar
bids over wind (BNetzA, 2019). In contrast to such policy designs our
fundamental proposal is to improve existing energy market regula-
tion in awaywhich exploits the complementarities of wind and solar
technologies in terms of their underlying heterogeneous resource
proﬁles and the correlation with time-varying electricity demand.
1 The proﬁle of solar largely coincides with the demand peak around midday;
during nighttime, however, demand is still large (although being at its lowest level),
while solar generation is zero. The correlation coeﬃcient between demand and solar
availability is 0.48. In contrast, wind shows a relatively ﬂat availability pattern,
implying an advantage during night hours when there is no generation from solar.
At the same time, however, wind is ill-suited to meet demand over the day, in
particular during peak hours. The correlation coeﬃcient for wind is 0.23. Over the
course of a year, seasonal changes in the monthly average of demand and resource
availabilities show a different picture: solar generation is negatively correlated with
demand (with a coeﬃcient of−0.74) whereas wind closely follows demand exhibiting
a strong positive correlation (with a coeﬃcient of 0.72).
2 As of today, the only energy storage technology for electricity used at large scale
is hydroelectric pumped-storage power (Schwab, 2009), representing about 99% of
the worldwide installed storage capacity (Rastler, 2010).
We also investigate how the need for energy storage changes when
this alternative buffering mechanism is optimally exploited. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to examine the potential role
of policy design for reducing the cost of integrating volatile RE supply.
To provide a conceptual and empirically-grounded framework for
thinking about the economics of integrating high shares of volatile
RE sources into an electricity market, we develop a numerical partial
equilibrium model of a wholesale electricity market which resolves
output decisions on hourly markets, time-dependent demand and
resource availabilities of wind and the sun, investments in RES pro-
duction capacity, curtailment decisions to maintain system stability,
and a detailed representation of the functioning of electricity storage.
Storage capacity is varied exogenously3 in order to gauge its impact
on overall system integration cost of renewables. The decentralized
market model is embedded in a welfare-maximizing problem of a
benevolent regulator who chooses RE support policies (through sub-
sidies on RE output which we model as a feed-in premium on top
of the market price) in order to implement an electricity market
with a high share of intermittent RE at the lowest cost to society.
While we calibrate the model to stylized conditions of the German
electricity market, we think that the main insights from our analy-
sis are also relevant for the electricity market context of many other
countries.
Ouranalysisprovides several important insights. First,weﬁnd that
the storage capacity needed to accommodate high shares of intermit-
tentREoutput is relativelymoderate,evenunderatechnology-neutral
RE support scheme. This implies that the potentially high costs of
providing storage at large scale in the future need not jeopardize
the achievement of environmental targets (i.e., the reduction of CO2
emissions through increasing the share of low-carbon renewables).
Second, we ﬁnd that the design of a RE support policy can have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on system integration cost as well as storage capacity
needs when there are several intermittent renewable technologies
with heterogeneous availability patterns of the underlying natural
resources (such as wind and solar energy). The smart differentiation
of RE subsidies affects investment patterns in a way which can effec-
tively reduce the curtailment of excess generation, in turn lowering
the need for costly investment in energy storage. We use a simple
3 In other words, agents in the model make decisions on electricity dispatch and
investment into RE capacity for several given storage levels without taking investment
cost for storage into consideration. Storage cost is then accounted for in an ex-post
cost-beneﬁt analysis with cost estimates for current storage technologies.
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cost-beneﬁt framework to show that optimal subsidy differentiation
signiﬁcantly reduces the level of optimal storage. In this sense, con-
cerns about the costs and availability of storage technologies in order
to enable the integration of high shares of intermittent RE supply in
futureelectricitymarketsandtoachieveenvironmentalgoalsareeven
more diminished if a smart design of RE support policies is chosen.
Third,within ourmodeling frameworkwhich captures high RE shares
up to 80% but not a completely decarbonized system, we ﬁnd that
the type of storagemost likely needed is short-term tomedium-term
storage. The additional beneﬁts from long-term seasonal storage are
relatively modest and most likely much smaller than its investment
costs.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways.
First, we add to the main insight, supported by a growing body of
economic and technical studies (see, for example, Zerrahn et al.,
2018, and references therein), that in order to integrate large shares
of volatile RE supply in future energy systems only moderate levels
of energy storage are needed.
Second, there isagrowing literatureonstoragecapacity inelectric-
itymarkets and its connection to theexpanding renewablegeneration
capacities. Linn and Shih (2016) investigate the impact of the intro-
duction of large storage capacities into current electricity systems
using numerical modeling of the Texas ERCOT region and stylized
theoretical considerations to assess the impact on total carbon emis-
sions of a system with dirty base load producers (coal), cleaner peak
load producers (gas), and renewables (wind, solar). Carson andNovan
(2013) use a theoretical model and empirical methods to show the
same effect in the ERCOT region, and, in addition, an adverse impact
of increased storage capacities on renewables with high production
correlation to peak demand (solar) and a positive impact on renew-
ableswhich produce at base-load hours (wind) due to a price-leveling
effectof storage.CrampesandMoreaux (2010)usea theoreticalmodel
of a hydro pumped-storage operator and a fossil generator to deter-
mine optimal joint usage of both technologies; they do not consider
intermittent RE sources. Helm andMier (2018) examine the effect on
CO2 emissions of subsidizing energy storage. In contrast to the above-
mentioned papers, we focus on market conditions as we expect in
a future electricity market with a very high level of intermittent RE
supply and highlight the role of regulatory design, besides energy
storage, for buffering volatility.
Third,we alsomake a connection to the emerging literature inves-
tigating the consequences of the fundamental heterogeneity of RE
technologieswith respect to availability patterns. Abrell et al. (2019b)
consider the environmental value and market value of different
renewables and deﬁne an environmental motive for differentiating
subsidies by technology, while Fell and Linn (2013) and Wibulpol-
prasert (2016) investigate the impact of resource heterogeneity on
cost-effectiveness of different abatement policies. Empirical studies
like Abrell et al. (2019a) evaluate different market values and envi-
ronmental values of RE sources ex-post.While these studies highlight
the need for improved policy design to incorporate external effects at
the system or market level, they focus on CO2 emissions but abstract
from storage investments and the issue of the cost of integrating
volatile RE supply for decarbonizing the electricity sector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the electricity market model. Section 3 provides detail
about the empirical speciﬁcation of the model (against the con-
text of the German electricity market). Section 4 presents the main
ﬁndings from the simulations investigating the trade-offs between
storage capacity and the role of technology-differentiated RE sup-
port policy as potential buffering mechanisms. Section 5 presents
a simple cost-beneﬁt analysis to gauge the level of optimal energy
storage needed to implement a market with a high share of volatile
RE supply under different assumptions about RE policy design.
Section 7 concludes by discussing implications and caveats of our
analysis.
2. The model
To assess alternative strategies for integrating a large share of
intermittent RE into an energy system, we employ a partial equi-
librium model of the wholesale electricity market which resolves
output decisions on hourly markets, time-dependent demand and
resource availabilities of wind and sun, investment decisions in pro-
duction capacity, curtailment decisions to maintain system stability,
and the functioning of electricity storage. The decentralized equi-
librium model is embedded in a welfare-maximizing problem of a
benevolent regulator who aims to implement an electricity market
with a high share of intermittent RE at lowest cost.
2.1. The regulator’s problem
The model comprises two levels. At the top level, a benevolent
regulator is concerned with the problem of implementing an exoge-
nous and given minimum level of RE generation in the market at the
lowest attainable total system cost C to society. The choice variable
is a RE support scheme which can take on the form of either a
technology-neutral support or technology-differentiated support. In
implementing the RE support scheme, the regulator has to take into
account theequilibriumconditionsof theelectricitymarket. Formally,
the regulator’s problem is then given by:
min
b
C (P(b),X(b))
s.t. P(b),X(b) ∈ E , (1)
where b denotes the policy choice of the regulator, P(b),X(b) are
the prices and quantities constituting the market equilibrium in the
electricity market for a given choice of the regulator, and E is the
set of all feasible equilibrium allocations in the wholesale electricity
market.
2.2. Feasible equilibrium allocations E of the wholesale electricity
market
Weformulate theequilibriumconditionsof thewholesaleelectric-
itymarket asamixedcomplementarityproblem(MCP, seeMathiesen,
1985; Rutherford, 1995) which is cast as a system of inequalities
whichderive from thedecisionproblemsof proﬁt-maximizing agents
with two types of conditions: zero-proﬁt conditions that are com-
plimentary to quantity variables X and market-clearing conditions
complementarytopricevariablesP. Theeconomicagents inourmodel
are electricity supplierswhichproduce either fromrenewable or from
conventional sources. Production technologies are denoted by i ∈ I
with subsets G for renewable technologies and B for conventionals.
We indicate time periods by t ∈ T .
2.2.1. Energy supply and investment
Agents maximize their proﬁts by choosing investments Ii and
generation for each time period Xit. The proﬁts are given by
Pi =
∑
t
[
(Pt +yiS)Xit − cgi (Xit)
]
− cii(Ii), (2)
where Pt denotes the market price at time t, S is the RE subsidy per
MWh produced which ﬁrms receive andyi is a policy choice variable
for the regulator which allows to differentiate the subsidy by tech-
nology if yi = yj. For conventional technologies, i ∈ B, yi = 0.
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The functions cgi (Xit) and c
i
i(Ii) denote generation cost and investment
cost, respectively.
Output can never exceed installed capacity, so the following
condition needs to be fulﬁlled:
ait
(
k¯i + Ii
)
≥ Xit ∀i, t. (3)
The parameter ait denotes the fraction of available capacity of
technology i at time t, which captures downtime of conventional
generators due to, for example, maintenance and the time-varying
availability of renewable technologies (intermittency). k¯i denotes
already installed capacity.
For an agent who maximizes proﬁts (Eq. (2)) subject to the
capacity constraint (Eq. (3)), we obtain the following ﬁrst order
conditions (FOCs):
∂cgi (Xit)
∂Xit
+ PIit ≥ Pt +yiS ⊥ Xit ≥ 0 ∀i, t (4)
∂cii(Ii)
∂ Ii
≥
∑
t
aitP
I
it ⊥ Ii ≥ 0 ∀i (5)
ait
(
k¯i + Ii
)
≥ Xit ⊥ PIit ≥ 0 ∀i, t. (6)
PIit is the shadow value of capacity which is complementary to
Eq. (3), which is expressed by the perpendicular operator ⊥. The
perpendicular operator indicates that in equilibrium a variable
is non-zero when the associated condition holds with equality,
whereas it has to be zero when the condition is a strict inequality.
2.2.2. Storage
The storage operator maximizes proﬁts PS from selling (release
from storage) and buying (injection into storage) electricity. The
proﬁt function is given by:
PS =
∑
t
(PtRt − PtJt) , (7)
where Rt denotes release from storage and Jt injection into storage.
We distinguish three types of capacities which are needed for the
storage process: release capacity k¯R, injection capacity k¯J, and storage
capacity k¯S. Similar to production, the installed storage capacities
constitute constraints to the proﬁt maximization problem of the
storage operator, which can be characterized by the following FOCs:
Mt + PSt ≥ Mt+1 ⊥ St ≥ 0 ∀t (8)
Pt ≥ xMt − PJt ⊥ Jt ≥ 0 ∀t (9)
Mt + PRt ≥ Pt ⊥ Rt ≥ 0 ∀t (10)
k¯S ≥ St ⊥ PSt ≥ 0 ∀t (11)
k¯J ≥ Jt ⊥ PJt ≥ 0 ∀t (12)
k¯R ≥ Rt ⊥ PRt ≥ 0 ∀t. (13)
PSt , P
J
t, and P
R
t are the shadow values of storage capacity, injection
capacity, and release capacity, respectively. The storage eﬃciency
parameter x captures roundtrip losses of the storage cycle and Mt
is the shadow value associated with the following condition which
ensures time consistency of storage across periods:
St + xJt − Rt = St+1 ⊥ Mt free ∀t. (14)
2.2.3. Curtailment
For the curtailment Cit of excess RE generation, we model a sys-
tem operator who is bound by the RE policy to buy all generation
from RE producers paying the market price and a subsidy Pt + yiS
and then sells the electricity in the market at market price Pt. They
choose how much of RE generation to curtail to maintain system
stability. Thus, the system operator maximizes the following proﬁt
function with choice variable Cit:
Psys =
∑
i,t
[Pt (Xit − Cit) − (Pt +yiS)Xit] , (15)
under the condition that curtailment cannot exceed production in
any period. This leads to the following FOCs:
Pt + PCit ≥ 0 ⊥ Cit ≥ 0 ∀i, t (16)
Xit ≥ Cit ⊥ PCit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (17)
where PCit denotes the shadow value of curtailment.
4
2.2.4. Market clearing and electricity price
At any time t electricity demand d¯t needs to be fulﬁlled. This is
expressed by the market clearing condition which is associated with
the electricity price Pt:5
∑
i
(Xit − Cit)+ Rt − Jt = d¯t ⊥ Pt free ∀t, (18)
where generation net of curtailment plus release from storage minus
injection into storage equals demand.
2.2.5. RE support
The regulator’s policy choice b = {yi}i∈I concerns the relative
subsidy for different renewable technologiesyiS in Eq. (4). The over-
all level of the subsidy is determined by the exogenous target c for
the share of RE generation in total production. Even though, demand
remains inelastic total production changes with increasing use of
storage capacity because a part of the generation going into storage,
(1 − x)Jt, is lost over the storage cycle. Thus, we introduce the follow-
ing condition to the MCP problem to capture the notion that a given
percentage of production over all technologies needs to originate
from RE sources:
∑
i∈G ,t
(Xit − Cit) ≥ c
∑
i,t
(Xit − Cit) ⊥ S ≥ 0, (19)
which formalizes the notion that renewable generation net of
curtailment needs to reach a given share c of total net generation.
2.2.6. Deﬁnition of equilibrium
The set of feasible equilibrium allocations E is deﬁned by prices
and quantities {p(b), x(b)}with prices p(b) =
{
Pt , PIit , P
S
t , P
J
t , P
R
t , P
C
it ,Mt
}
determined by market-clearing conditions (18), (6), (11), (12), (13),
(17), and (14) and quantities x(b) = {Xit,Cit, Ii,St, Jt,Rt} determined
by zero-proﬁt conditions (4), (16), (5), (8), (9), and (10).
4 Note that k¯S , k¯J , and k¯R are parameters, i.e. we do not model investment decisions
in energy storage but rather the problem of how to optimally operate a given storage
capacity. Section 5 then turns to the broader problem of choosing an optimal level of
storage capacity given associated costs and beneﬁts.
5 The market clearing condition holds with strict equality which implies that its
dual variable is free in sign. We continue to use the perpendicular operator ⊥ to
indicate the complementarity
[∑
i (Xit − Cit)+ Rt − Jt − d¯t
]
Pt = 0.
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2.3. Total system cost C and system integration cost
Total system cost C is deﬁned by the sum of investment cost for
RES and generation cost:
C =
∑
i
cii(Ii) +
∑
i,t
cgit(Xit). (20)
We now turn to a discussion howwemeasure system integration
cost of intermittent renewables within our model. Generally, system
integration cost comprises uncertainty cost, grid expansion cost, and
intermittency cost. As intermittency cost is found to make up the
largest share in total integration cost (see Hirth et al., 2015; Hirth,
2015;Gowrisankaranetal.,2016),ourmodelabstracts fromstochastic
weather changes and associated forecast errors and from modeling
the electric power grid.
Intermittency cost, i.e. the cost associated with foreseeable
variations in resource availability over time, manifests itself in the
model as investment ineﬃciency of RE capacity. The RE target c
demands a certain percentage of total consumptionof electricity from
RE sources but their availabilities, {ait}t∈T for i ∈ G , prohibit them
from ﬂexibly satisfying demand d¯t in each period. If c is high, gen-
eration from hours with high availability does not suﬃce to fulﬁll
the overall target. Consequently, investments need to be chosen such
that RE capacity contributes, also in hours with low resource avail-
ability, substantial amounts of electricity to satisfy demand. In hours
with high resource availability, RE generation exceeds demand and
the excess generation needs to be shed according to condition (16).
This mechanism thus links curtailment Cit to intermittency cost:
the more ineﬃcient the investment and the more total curtailment,
the higher the intermittency cost. Ourmeasure for intermittency cost
precisely exploits thismechanism by focusing on average investment
cost. We calculate investment cost, cii(Ii), per net generation, i.e. RE
generation net of curtailment,
∑
t (Xit − Cit):
ji =
cii(Ii)∑
t (Xit − Cit)
∀i ∈ G . (21)
j i measures the eﬃciency of RE capacity use and is never zero as long
as there is investment into RE capacity. As an average value, j i is also
useful in comparing system integration cost across situations with
different levels of storage investment.
3. Data and model calibration
This section describes the data sources used for the calibration of
the model presented in Section 2. To calibrate the model we need
to specify the following parameters: hourly demand d¯t , the time-
varying availability factors for RE ait, the eﬃciency parameters and
capacities for storage x, k¯S , k¯J, and k¯R. We also need to choose the
functional forms of the cost functions for generation and investment,
cgi and c
i
i , and estimate their functional parameters based on available
data.
For the calibration, an important question regarding the time
perspective arises: on the one hand, we want to model the dispatch
decisions of economic agents in a market with a very high share of
intermittent renewables as is expected to be the situation in a future
electricity market (for example, in the year 2050) in which energy
regulation steps in to meet strict emission goals; on the other hand,
the investment decisions we model need to be taken well before
2050 under market conditions which resemble more closely the
current state of the energy system. In order to obtain a stylized and
yet fairly realistic representation of RE investment, we thus calibrate
the model to the current (i.e., year 2014) conditions of the German
electricity market. Since conventional capacity is usually long-lived,
we use the current technology mix as a basis for the calibration
of the conventional supply curve but use fuel prices in line with
predictions for 2050 which would govern future electricity market
dispatch decisions.
3.1. Demand and RE resource availability
In order to capture the seasonal variation of demand and resource
availability of RE technologies, we model an entire year with hourly
time resolution. To keep the model numerically tractable we restrict
the total number of hours modeled to 8weeks (1344h) which are
chosen to represent all four seasons of the year. We take hourly
demand d¯t from the European Network of Transmission System
Operators (ENTSO-E, 2016). To obtain the availability of RE sources
ait we assume that wind and solar having very low variable produc-
tion cost will produce electricity whenever the natural resource is
available. The fraction of actual production at any given hour and
the nominally installed capacity provides us then with a percent-
age value of resource availability. For this, we use generation data of
renewables from German transmission system operators (50Hertz,
2018; Amprion, 2018; Tennet, 2018; TransnetBW, 2018).
3.2. Storage
Given the considerable uncertainties about which storage tech-
nologieswill dominate in the future andabout their cost and technical
limitations we aim to keep our model framework as ﬂexible as pos-
sible for storage. The model setup with the storage Eqs. (8)–(14) is
generic in the sense that any storage technology will have some kind
of capacity for injection, storage, and release of electricity and time
consistency will always have to be guaranteed.6 For the capacities
associated with storage (storage capacity k¯S , injection capacity k¯J,
and release capacity k¯R), we use the values reported by Hartmann
et al. (2012) to specify the storage capacity of the reference case. In
the numerical simulation, we vary these values exogenously, that is
economic agents do not make endogenous investment decisions for
storage capacity but rather treat it as given. Finally, we adopt a 75%
roundtrip eﬃciency for storage, x, which is in line with values from
the literature for pumped hydro storage (PHS) (see, e.g. Egerer et
al., 2014; Newbery, 2016). In their Table B1, Zakeri and Syri (2015)
report a range of 70%–82% for PHS and a larger range (60% to 95%) for
other technologies, such as compressed air energy storage (CAES) and
different kinds of batteries. We will perform a sensitivity analysis for
x = 60% and x = 90% to capture the impact of storage eﬃciency
of different technologies on the results (see Section 6).
3.3. Conventional generation
We aggregate all fossil-based generation (gas, coal, oil) into one
conventional supply curve. We start out by constructing a merit
order curve for German power stations with data from Open Power
System Data (2017). Electricity generating plants are ranked by
marginal production cost taking into account fuel cost and heat
eﬃciencies. Estimates for future fuel prices are taken from IEA’s
World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency, 2018). We
then ﬁt ∂cg/∂Xit as a linear marginal cost curve to the data, which
accounts for the rising marginal cost of a heterogeneous ﬂeet of
power plants. We report the coeﬃcients of the estimate in Table 1.
The original data of themerit order curve and the linear ﬁt are shown
in Fig. 2.
We assume that the existing conventional generation capacity is
large enough (similar to the current situation in Germany) so as to be
6 We can even include demand side management in such a framework in that it
is understood as shifting load over time just as physical storage technologies do.
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Table 1
Production capacities k¯i and OLS-ﬁtted linear functions for marginal generation cost ∂c
g
i /∂Xit and marginal investment cost ∂c
i
i/∂ Ii .
Energy supply technologies Electricity storage
Conventional Wind Solar Storage Injection Release
Installed capacities
(
k¯i , k¯S , k¯J , k¯R
)
MW 90000 0 0 – 6400 6400
MWh – – – 37700 – –
Marginal generation cost functions
(
∂cgi (Xit)/∂Xit
)
Intercept
(
€
MWh
)
5.0 0 0 – – –
Slope
(
€
MWh2
)
2.2 × 10−3 – – – – –
Marginal investment cost functions
(
∂cii(Ii)/∂ Ii
)
Intercept
(
€
MW
)
– 60618 41752 – – –
Slope
(
€
MW2
)
– 0.24 0.06 – – –
able to fulﬁll demand at any time; see Table 1 for the numerical value
of k¯conventional. This is tantamount to abstracting from investment
decisions in the generation capacity of conventional technologies
(i.e., Ii = 0 for i ∈ B).
3.4. Renewable generation
Renewable generators incur zero variable generation cost and
hence we assume cgi (Xit) = 0 for i ∈ G . The most important cost
parameter forRE sources is investment cost cii(Ii). Sincewindand solar
energy depend on a natural resource, there is geographical hetero-
geneity of site quality for installations. Assuming that investments
are made in favorable sites ﬁrst and then continue in locations with
decreasing wind and solar resources we model investment cost to
be increasing in total investment Ii even though nominal investment
cost perMWcapacity is constant7. Thus,we choose a linear functional
formformarginal investment cost∂ci/∂ Ii. To estimate theparameters
of this function we use data on full load hours8 and total capac-
ity potential for each German state from Agentur für Erneuerbare
Energien (AEE, 2018) to construct a curve showing resource quality
vs. investment into capacity. When starting with the potential with
the highest full load hours and continuing in decreasing order the
resulting curve is also decreasing in Ii. We obtain the investment cost
curve by dividing nominal annualized investment cost per MW from
Kost et al. (2013) by full load hours. The ﬁnal investment cost curve
obtained in this way is increasing in Ii and we report the estimated
parameters in Table 1.9
We adopt a green ﬁeld approach for RE, that is pre-installed
renewable capacity is zero (i.e., k¯i = 0 for i ∈ I ). Investors choose
the amount of investment Ii according to zero-proﬁt condition (5)
and the RE target (19).
3.5. Computational strategy
We conclude this section with a short description of the numeri-
cal solving strategy that we employ in the simulations. The top-level
problem of the regulator, the cost minimization in Eq. (1), is for-
mulated as a Mathematical Program under Equilibrium Constraints
7 For our analysis, we abstract from technological progress and a connected positive
learning externality. While this would have an impact on the level of the optimal RE
subsidy, the motivation for subsidy differentiation to reduce integration cost would
be unchanged.
8 Full load hours are ameasure for the resource quality at a given site. They translate
the total production over a year from a RE generator into the number of hours needed
to generate the same amount of electricity at fully employed installed capacity.
9 See Abrell et al. (2019b) for a more detailed description of the calibration method
of the investment curves.
(MPEC), that is cost is minimized subject to constraints stemming
from an equilibrium problem (Luo et al., 1996) which we denoted by
the set of feasible allocations E in Section 2. We express the lower-
level equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995). Due to the lack of robust
solvers for MPECs (Luo et al., 1996) we solve the lower level MCP
problem over a suitable grid to ﬁnd the minimum cost and thus the
solution to the MPEC using the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995)
for complementarity problems and the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS).
4. Buffering volatility: storage investments vs. differentiated
renewable energy support
This section presents the results of our numerical simulations.
First we brieﬂy explain the scenarios considered and the simulations
that we performed. We continue by summarizing the main ﬁndings
and then go on to explain the underlying market mechanisms in
more detail in the remaining subsections.
4.1. Design of counterfactual experiments
To examine the role of the storage investments and differentiated
renewable support schemes,wemodel the following three scenarios:
• No policy assumes that (i) RE support policy is absent and that
(ii) storage capacity is equal to the currently installed pumped
hydro storage capacity in Germany (37.7GWh as of 2014). This
scenario serves as a suitable reference point for analyzing the
additional costs and beneﬁts of future expansions of storage.
• Neutral subsidy assumes that the RE target is implemented by
a technology-neutral subsidy (modeled as a market premium)
for RE generation.
• Differentiated subsidyassumes that theRE target is implemented
by a market premium which is optimally differentiated by RE
technology so as to minimize total system cost.10
Under No policy, generation from RE makes up 42% of total
generation, which can be broken down further into 22.5% generation
from solar and 19.5% from wind. Since the RE share in this scenario
10 Note that by design investors receive payments for possible generation even if
the system operator curtails parts of the RE generation. Thus, investment decisions
in RE capacity do not take into account curtailed energy. It is beyond the scope of
the paper to study to what extent other policy design, for example, RE subsidies
based on installed capacity (i.e., MW instead of MWh), can address integration costs
in terms of curtailment.
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Fig. 2. Linear ﬁt to merit order of marginal generation cost of conventional electricity producers in Germany. The linear ﬁt is used as supply curve for conventionals in the
simulations of Section 4.
is moderate and there are no incentives in place from a RE support
scheme, investment into renewables is such that there is very little
costly curtailment.
For both policy scenarios with a RE support scheme, we choose a
70% target for the share of electricity generated from wind or solar.
This constitutes an intermediate target given the range of 64% to 97%
as detailed in EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (cf. Section 1).11 We exoge-
nously expand available storage capacity from zero to a value which
is suﬃciently high as to be quasi unlimited. Varying storage capacity
enables us to obtain total system costs as a function of the storage
level.
4.2. Overview of main results
Fig. 3 shows the total system cost C for different levels of the
given storage capacity under the three scenarios. Threemain insights
emerge. First, it is evident that an increase in storage capacity strongly
reduces system cost for low levels of installed storage capacity but
marginal beneﬁts (i.e., avoided cost) rapidly diminish as storage
capacity increases. Marginal beneﬁts from storage quickly approach
zero at capacity levels of around 400GWh, corresponding to 10.6
times the installed storage capacity in 2014, or, equivalently, 6.5 aver-
age demand hours. This indicates that further discussion about the
costs and beneﬁts of storage capacity should concentrate on low to
moderate levels of storage investment.
Second, the behavior of the storage operator for low to medium
storage capacities (i.e., up to 400GWh) shows exclusively intra-day
storage cycles and no shifts of generation over seasons. We observe
seasonal storage only for considerably higher installed storage capac-
ities. Since the marginal beneﬁts of storage capacity from avoided
curtailment are zero for high values of installed capacity (i.e., beyond
400GWh), it seems possible that the costs of seasonal storage exceed
beneﬁts, even in scenarios where the share of RE generation is as
large as 70%. This suggests that investments into short-term storage
11 Note that unlike our RE target, these percentages also include electricity from
hydro sources and biomass.
technologies will possibly play a more important role as compared
to longer-term, seasonal storage.
Third, the cost curve associated with a technology-speciﬁc RE
support scheme shows that for low to medium storage capacities
substantial savings in total system costs are possible. For low levels
of storage capacity these can be as high as 11.4% of total system
cost in a scenario without storage capacity and 7.7% if the current,
installed storage capacity is assumed. This indicates that, given a
ﬁxed target for RE generation, improving the design of RE support
schemes can either reduce total system cost in a scenario with given
storage capacity or partially substitute for storage investment.12
The following subsections provide more detail about the market
mechanisms behind these insights and provide further explanations
and detailed results.
4.3. The effects of adding storage capacity
Storage capacity can act as a complement to intermittent renew-
ables in that a storage operator has an incentive to ﬁll the storagewith
cheap electricity in low-price hours, when there is abundant renew-
able generation, and to release electricity from storage in hours with
high prices, when wind and solar generation is scarce. What is the
value of adding storage capacity at the system or market-wide level?
4.3.1. Total and marginal beneﬁts of storage
Fig. 3 provides measures for the total and marginal beneﬁts of
installing storage capacity: the total beneﬁts of a given storage level
are measured by the cost difference relative to a situation with zero
storage; the marginal beneﬁts are given by the negative derivative of
the total system cost curve.With increasing storage capacity the total
cost curves for the no-policy scenario aswell as the twopolicy scenar-
ios go towards a steady state which is reached when the constraints
12 Note that this result is independent from the actual need for RE support policies
in the future. If in a situation where RE shares are high even without a subsidy pol-
icy integration cost can be lowered by altering the relative investment cost ratio of
renewables the regulator can resort to a policy where the “subsidy” is zero for one
technology and non-zero for the other.
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Fig. 3. Total system cost for rising storage capacity. Note: In the simulations, storage capacity is varied exogenously and therefore investment cost for storage is not reﬂected in
total system cost as deﬁned in Eq. (20).
on storage are all non-binding and the intermittency of renewables
is buffered by storage as much as possible.13 At this point, intermit-
tency cost of RE is minimal and comparing total system cost at this
point with total system cost for zero storage capacity allows us to
gauge the maximum potential gains from storage (and, at the same
time, total intermittency cost). Performing this calculation for the
scenario with a Neutral subsidy to achieve a 70% RE target, we ﬁnd
that the maximum cost savings due to storage are 37% of total sys-
tem cost with zero storage or 30% when using the currently installed
storage capacity of our reference case. This number shows that from
a system perspective, potential cost savings from storage are sub-
stantial but it also serves as an upper bound for the economically
viable level of investment into storage.
For the actual storage investment decision of economic agents,
marginal beneﬁts of storage (alongside marginal cost) are crucial.
Since the total cost curves go towards a steady state, their derivatives
and thus marginal beneﬁts go to zero. The decrease in marginal ben-
eﬁts of storage is steep so that from a system-wide perspective, most
of the potential cost savings through storage capacity are achieved up
to roughly 200GWh. If we assume non-zero capital cost for storage,
above this threshold, the incentives to add further storage capac-
ity decrease rapidly even though cost savings in total system cost
are still possible. We will further substantiate this argument in the
cost-beneﬁt analysis below.
We now take a closer look at what drives the beneﬁts from
additional storage. Storage reduces total system cost by preventing
curtailment of generation fromRE sources, thereby reducing the need
for investment into RE capacity to meet a given RE target, i.e. invest-
ments into RE capacity are used more eﬃciently. Table 2 collects the
relevant numerical results fromour simulations.We report the values
for key quantities such as total cost C and average investment cost
13 Even if storage capacity is unconstrained energy loss over the storage cycle
cannot be avoided because its roundtrip eﬃciency is below 100%. This is a potential
source for intermittency cost other than curtailment. The technology which is more
likely to go into storage due to its availability pattern (in our case PV) then will
contribute more to the remaining intermittency cost. For the impact of this effect
on optimal subsidy differentiation see Sections 4.4 and 6.
j i for both policy scenarios, Neutral subsidy and Differentiated sub-
sidy, and storage capacity increasing from currently installed levels to
unlimited storage. As shown in Fig. 3, there is a 30% decrease in total
cost with increasing storage for a Neutral subsidy from 40.8 Billion
Euro to 28.5 Billion Euro. Together with total cost we report its two
components, total investment cost per technology, cii(Ii) for i ∈ G , and
conventional generation cost,
∑
tc
g
it(Xit) for i ∈ B. With increasing
storage, generation cost decreases due to storage substituting expen-
sive conventional generation in peak hours, which results in overall
lower fuel cost. As the numbers in Table 2 show, this is a reduction
by 35% from current storage levels to unlimited storage, but the cost
savings in absolute terms are small compared to cost savings in total
renewable investment cost. The driver of cost reductions is total cur-
tailment,
∑
tCit for i ∈ G , which decreases with increasing storage
capacity and goes to zero. This is mirrored in the evolution of our
eﬃciency measure j i which reports average investment cost per net
generation. For both RE technologies the average investment cost
shows a decreasing trendwith increasing storage consistent with the
decrease in curtailment.14
Fig. 4 illustrates the impact of increasing storage capacity on RE
investment by technology. We observe a steep decline in installed
capacity for both technologies (associatedwith the increasing utiliza-
tion eﬃciency) when storage is ﬁrst introduced, which corresponds
to a large marginal beneﬁt of storage in this early stage of invest-
ments. As storage capacity increases until ﬁnally reaching a steady
state, the relative share of solar power increases compared to wind
as can also seen by the generation shares reported in Table 2. This is
the case because solar has cheaper investment cost per MW but is
also inherently more volatile in its availability (having a daily period
of zero output during nighttime and strong production peaks around
noon).With rising storage capacity the disadvantages of this volatility
disappear and make it more competitive relative to wind power.
14 The slight increase in average investment cost for PV under unlimited storage
stems from the fact that overall investment in solar is growing with increasing storage
capacity and that rising marginal investment costs with degrading resource quality
offset the gains from better utilization of capacity.
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Table 2
Overview of key impacts for alternative eﬃcient RE support policies.
Storage factora Curtailment,∑
tCit [TWh]
Gen. share by
tech. (%)b
Av. investment cost,
ji
[
EUR
MWh
]
c
Tot. inv. cost,
cii(Ii) [B. EUR]
Gen. cost,∑
i,tc
g
it(Xit)
Tot. cost,
C
Subsidy
diff.
Wind PV Wind PV Wind PV Wind PV [B. EUR] [B. EUR] (%)d
Neutral subsidy
1 (37.7GWh) 46.3 94.0 30.5 39.5 94.2 84.9 15.5 18.1 7.1 40.8 100
5 (188.5GWh) 12.5 21.3 27.4 42.6 74.8 62.2 11.3 14.7 6.3 32.3 100
10 (377GWh) 1.8 3.6 24.6 45.4 67.7 57.9 9.4 14.8 5.7 29.9 100
Unlim. 0 0 20.1 49.9 64.4 58.1 7.4 16.5 4.6 28.5 100
Differentiated subsidy
1 (37.7GWh) 44.7 29.2 39.8 30.2 94.4 64.3 20.3 10.5 6.8 37.6 62
5 (188.5GWh) 12.0 11.5 31.3 38.7 76.0 58.8 13.2 12.6 6.2 31.9 74
10 (377GWh) 1.8 2.3 26.4 43.6 68.6 57.2 10.2 13.4 5.7 29.8 84
Unlim. 0 0 21.7 48.3 65.2 57.7 8.0 15.9 4.6 28.5 91
a Storage factor denotes storage capacity in multiples of the currently installed capacity (37.7GWh).
b Note that the generation shares always add up to the policy target of 70%.
c Average investment cost is measured in annuitized investment cost per generation net of curtailment.
d We report the percentage value of the subsidy per MWh for PV relative to wind.
4.3.2. Volatility of equilibrium electricity prices
The diminishing volatility for an increasing storage capacity is also
reﬂected by a reduced dispersion of equilibrium electricity prices on
hourly wholesale markets. A comparison across the Panels (a)–(d)
in Fig. 5 shows that the price volatility sharply reduces as storage
capacity increases, reaching its theoretical minimum when storage
capacity is unlimited.15
4.3.3. Intra-day vs. seasonal storage
The maximally observed reduction in price volatility is only
possiblewhen storage capacity is very large or unlimited and the stor-
age operator engages in shifting electricity generation over seasons
in addition to shorter storage cycles. To illustrate the two principal
ways how storage operates in the electricity market over the differ-
ent time scales, Fig. 6 contrasts the behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing
storage operator for a situation with constrained (equal to 377GWh)
and unlimited (equal to 6032GWh) storage capacity. The following
insights emerge.
First, there is a short-term consideration associated with the
intra-day storage of electricity which aims at exploiting the price
differentials between low-price and high-price periods over a typi-
cal day. Optimization over this short-term cycle is closely associated
with solar generation and shifts excess PV generation from daytime
hours to hours with little or no solar availability. Intra-day storage
optimization is present for caseswith both constrained andunlimited
storage capacity. Second, when constraints on storage are lifted, we
observe a long-term behavior with seasonal storage where reserves
are ﬁlled over the summermonths (mostlywith solar generation) and
depleted in winter and spring periods when solar energy is scarce.
When the storage level is 10 times the base-year level (377GWh), the
marginal cost savings have become small and are rapidly decreasing
towards zero. This suggests that, even with a relatively aggressive
RE target of 70%, seasonal storage is not feasible as the necessary
capacity investments will neither pay off for investors nor do they
substantially reduce the total system cost (or increase the market
surplus) to society.
15 The remaining price variation under unlimited storage capacity is due to
roundtrip eﬃciency losses. As we assume a 25% loss of energy over the storage
cycle, there needs to be a price spread between periods of injection into and release
from storage for the storage activity to be economically viable.
4.4. Differentiated renewable energy support schemes
Mandating that a large share of electricity has to come from inter-
mittent RE has been shown to cause substantial system integration
costs (see Section 4.3 and the text around Fig. 3). One strategy for
buffering volatility and to reduce system integration cost (i.e., curtail-
ment) is to increase storage capacity. Coping with volatility through
this channel, however, is subject to a trade-off between the cost
savings in system integration cost and the rising cost for storage
investment—and we have shown that the marginal beneﬁts from
additional storage investments rapidly diminish at the system level.
An alternative buffering mechanism is through optimizing the regu-
latory design of the RE support scheme in order to take advantage of
the complementarity of the underlying natural resources and their
correlation with time-varying electricity demand.
Our key ﬁnding here is that a technology-neutral RE support
scheme (for example, implemented as a per MWh subsidy on RE
output) is not a cost-effective strategy to reach a given RE target at
lowest cost to society. The cost of achieving a given RE target can be
signiﬁcantly lowered by optimally differentiating the policy support
among RE technologies.16
As there are interdependencies between both buffering strategies
(i.e., differentiated RE subsidies and enhanced storage capacity), we
analyze the potential of differentiated RE support for different levels
of storage capacity. Table 2 reports the optimal differentiation of the
subsidy for solar compared to wind. For the current storage capacity,
solar receives only 62% of wind subsidy per MWh produced. Solar
energy has lower investment cost per MW and its resource avail-
ability is highly concentrated during a few hours of the day. With a
high targeted share of RE and with low storage capacity, this implies
a much higher curtailment of solar energy as compared to wind.
The lower subsidy leads to a shift of investment from PV to wind,
thereby lowering the average investment cost for solar as the remain-
ing solar capacity can be used more eﬃciently. Accordingly, average
investment costji for solar for each storage level is lower than the cor-
respondingvaluewithaneutral subsidy.Asadirectconsequence,with
anoptimallydifferentiatedsubsidyweobserve lowertotalsystemcost
16 Note, however, that technology-differentiation is not the only possible way to
address these issues. Other subsidy designs such as a per MW subsidy or a subsidy
per MWh which is only given for generation which is not curtailed could also be
considered.
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Fig. 4. RE investment with increasing storage capacity.
for low tomedium storage capacities where curtailment of RE gener-
ation is necessary. With increasing storage, curtailment is reduced to
zero and the motive for differentiation vanishes almost completely
and remains at 91%. This moderate differentiation is explained by
storage eﬃciency losses because generation from solar is more likely
to go into storage than generation from wind.
Similar to increased storage capacity, differentiated RE support
brings about a reduction in curtailment—however, the mecha-
nism is different. Under a neutral RE subsidy, investments into RE
technologiesarechosensuchthatmarginal investmentcostsareequal
across the two technologies. Due to the intermittent nature of RE
sources this causes demand and supply to be mismatched in a large
number of periods with the implication of high (and costly) curtail-
ment. Since the subsidy is designed in a way that generators receive
additional revenue for each unit produced, even though this unitmay
have to be curtailed, agents do not take into account the mismatch of
demand and supply, i.e. they do not properly internalize the curtail-
ment costs associatedwithmore volatile RE supplywhen taking their
(a) Storage level 1 (37.7 GWh). (b) Storage level 5 (188.5 GWh).
(c) Storage level 10 (377 GWh). (d) Unlimited storage.
Fig. 5. Hourly electricity price for a 70% RE target with a technology-neutral RE subsidy and increasing storage capacity measured in multiples of the currently (i.e., year 2014)
installed level.
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Fig. 6. Electricity generation stored over the course of a year. The horizontal lines indicate the maximum storage capacity available in the two cases of constrained (377GWh)
and unlimited storage capacity. Under unlimited storage, the capacity of 6032GWh is never exhausted.
investment decisions. In contrast, optimal differentiation of the RE
subsidy induces investment patterns such that the marginal invest-
ment costs can differ between the two intermittent RE technologies.
Total system costs are reduced as curtailment decreases due to a “bet-
ter usability” of electricity, i.e. by exploiting the complementarities
with respect to the availability of the underlying natural resource and
its correlation with electricity demand. To a smaller extent, when
storage eﬃciency is below 100%, differentiation favors the technol-
ogy which is less dependent on storage, reducing energy losses and
thus total system cost are also reduced.
5. Howmuch energy storage?—A simple cost-beneﬁt analysis
This section explores the question how much energy storage
is optimally needed to achieve a certain share of intermittent RE
at the lowest cost to society. In trying to tackle this question, we
keep the conceptual framework deliberately simple and adopt a
canonical cost-beneﬁt analysis based on the equalization of marginal
beneﬁts and marginal costs. The main idea is as follows. First, we
make use of the detailed electricity simulation model presented in
Section 4 to characterize the marginal beneﬁts of energy storage.
Second, we obtain estimates for the marginal costs of energy stor-
age by brieﬂy reviewing the relevant literature. Third, the optimal
level of energy storage capacity is then determined based on a com-
parison of marginal costs and beneﬁts. We also examine how the
choice of regulatory design—with respect to a technology-neutral
or technology-speciﬁc support mechanism which has been shown
to act as a potential buffer against the market volatility induced by
intermittent RE technologies—affects the optimal level of storage.
5.1. Marginal costs curve
For the construction of the marginal costs of installing different
levels of energy storage, we refer to empirical estimates documented
in the literature. Characterizing marginal costs over a large range
of storage levels is, of course, fraught with large diﬃculties. First,
the investment costs for both current and future storage technolo-
gies are highly uncertain. Second, reliable estimates for the potential
of different storage technologies are also subject to considerable
uncertainty.
We rely on cost estimates for storage technologies from Zakeri
and Syri (2015) and on estimates for the potential of different tech-
nologies from Hartmann et al. (2012).17 Table 3 summarizes these
estimates which provide the basis for deriving a marginal cost curve
for storage capacity. We construct the marginal cost curve as a step
function with horizontal steps corresponding to the installation cost
of the respective storage technology and with the length of the hor-
izontal lines corresponding to the respective potential. Fig. 7 shows
the cost curves for the Low and Medium cost assumptions. Note that
we showonly the lowest stepwhich represents the cheapest option—
compressed air energy storage. The other parts of the step-function
to the right of the lowest step are not relevant for our discussion
given the range of storage level spanned by the marginal beneﬁts
curves.
5.2. Marginal beneﬁts curve
We construct the marginal beneﬁts curve for energy storage
based on the simulations of the wholesale electricity market model
described in Section 4. Speciﬁcally, we use model estimates of how
total system costs change with different levels of energy storage (see
Fig. 3). The marginal beneﬁt of adding a small amount of storage
capacity is equal to the negative derivative of the total cost curve.
Numerically, this is approximated by the difference quotient of total
cost with respect to storage capacity evaluated for different storage
levels. Let C ∗(k¯S ) denote the equilibrium cost for a given storage
level k¯S . The marginal beneﬁts of energy storage, b
(
k¯S
)
, are then
given by:
b
(
k¯S
)
= −
C ∗
(
k¯S
)
− C ∗
(
k¯S − h
)
h
, (22)
17 Comparing to other studies, cost estimates by Zakeri and Syri (2015) are at
the lower end of the cost range. Using rather low cost estimates, our results are
conservative in the sense of being favorable for storage investments. However, the
available studies cannot incorporate highly uncertain future cost reductions due
to technological breakthroughs. Thus, the given cost estimates represent a current
state for these technologies.
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Table 3
Estimates taken from the literature to construct the marginal cost curve for storage.
Cost [million EUR/GWh] Potential [GWh]
Technology Low Medium High
Pumped hydro storage 96 137 181 2000
Compressed air energy storage 48 92 106 27000
Power to gas 227 262 457 380000
Batteriesa 368 427 659 –b
Notes: Cost estimates are taken from Zakeri and Syri (2015) and estimates of potentials
from Hartmann et al. (2012).
a The values for batteries are own calculations of average values over different
battery technologies in Zakeri and Syri (2015).
b Since batteries are not subject to similar physical restrictions as mechanical stor-
age technologies, their maximum potential is likely to be very high. We refrain from
reporting a value on this since it is highly uncertain.
where h denotes the step size, i.e. the difference between single
points on the storage capacity axis.18 Fig. 7 depicts the numerical
marginal beneﬁts function for each of the two RE policy cases (i.e.,
Neutral subsidy and Differentiated subsidy).
5.3. Optimal storage capacity and the impact of technology-speciﬁc RE
policy
The simple cost-beneﬁt framework depicted by Fig. 7 enables us
to draw several conclusions. First, given the available cost estimates
for storage, the economically optimal storage capacity to integrate
intermittent RE supply consistent with a 70% RE target is moderate in
any case: underMedium cost assumptions, and a technology-neutral
RE support, roughly doubling the level of existing capacitieswould be
suﬃcient for the German electricity market; under Low cost assump-
tions, the optimal storage level is about 150GWh or four times larger
than the currently installed level. These ﬁndings are in linewith large
parts of the literature; see, for example, Zerrahn et al. (2018) and the
studies cited therein. Zerrahn et al. (2018) ﬁnd that for a RE target of
70%, the optimal storage level is 230GWhwhich lies both within the
range of estimates obtained by our approach as well as the bulk of
the literature.
Second, Fig. 7 visualizes the striking impact of carefully designed
technology-speciﬁc RE support on the optimal level of energy stor-
age. Optimal differentiation of RE subsidies reduces curtailment and
thus the marginal beneﬁts from storage. As a result, the optimal
level of storage capacity is considerably lower: under Medium cost
assumptions, no additional investment into storage beyond current
installations is needed; under Low storage cost, a storage capac-
ity of approximately 90GWh is optimal—almost half of what would
be optimally needed under a technology-neutral RE support. This
suggests that coping with the volatility induced by intermittent RE
sources can be achieved to a large extent through smart policy design
which subsidizes RE technologies according to their heterogeneous
value for system integration cost (rather than determining the level
of subsidies based on a narrow consideration of investment costs per
MW of production capacity).
6. Sensitivity analysis
We check the robustness of our main ﬁndings by varying param-
eter values along two important dimensions, the policy target for the
RE share in production (denoted by c in Section 2) and the roundtrip
eﬃciency of storage (denoted by x in Section 2). Table 4 reports
values for several key variables of our analysis for the parameter
choice in our main results section (c = 70%, x = 75%) which we
18 For practical reasons, we choose h to coincide with the numerical step size that
was used to obtain the simulations in Section 4.
denote as core case and for several alternative scenarios: high eﬃ-
ciency (c = 70%, x = 90%), low eﬃciency (c = 70%, x = 60%), and
high RES (c = 80%, x = 75%).
6.1. Higher required RE share
With rising sharesofREgeneration the impactof the intermittency
of wind and solar resources on the total electricity system becomes
more pronounced and the mismatch between demand and supply
more severe. We explore the implications of a 10% increase in RE
generation from 70% to 80% of total generation and report the results
in Table 4 in columns four and eight (H. RES) for a neutral subsidy
and a differentiated subsidy, respectively. Due to the higher RE share
requirements total cost and curtailment increase considerably when
the available storage capacity is low. We ﬁnd, however, very similar
characteristics as in the core case. As expected, rising storage capacity
decreases cost of curtailment (as can be seen from the decrease in
total cost when storage capacity increases). In line with our ﬁndings
for the core case, differentiation of the subsidy has the potential to
reduce total cost considerably for low levels of storage capacity. At
current levels of storage (storage factor 1), subsidy differentiation
reduces total system cost by 30%, which is a larger effect than was
observed in the core case. Because more generation from renewables
needs to be integrated in the system our cost-beneﬁt analysis yields
also considerably higher optimal storage capacity (309GWh, roughly
eight timesthecurrentcapacity)whichcanbereducedby29%through
subsidydifferentiation. Fig. 8 is anupdatedversionof Fig. 6 for thehigh
RES scenario and we observe that at a storage capacity of 377GWh
(ten times the currently installed capacity) andwell above theoptimal
capacitywith a neutral subsidy scheme (309GWh)we do not observe
a clear seasonal storage behavior as the onewe observe for unlimited
storage capacity (6786GWh) in the same ﬁgure.
6.2. Eﬃciency of storage
The eﬃciency of storage (capturing the energy losses over one full
storage cycle of injection, storage, and release of electricity) varies
considerably over different storage technologies and is amajor deter-
minant of their overall performance and impact on the electricity
system. The eﬃciency x = 75% which is used for the core case sim-
ulations is in line with values reported for hydro storage (see, e.g.
Egerer et al., 2014; Newbery, 2016; Zakeri and Syri, 2015). For other
promising technologies such as compressed air energy storage and
batteries, eﬃciencyvarieswithinawideof about60% to90%(seeTable
B1 in Zakeri and Syri, 2015). We therefore add two scenarios with
these extreme values for eﬃciency, high eﬃciency and low eﬃciency,
to our sensitivity analysis capturing different technology choices for
storage. The results are reported in Table 4 in columns two and three
for a neutral subsidy and columns six and seven for a differentiated
subsidy.
A comparison of the results for high and low storage eﬃciency
with the core case shows relatively small changes for most variables.
The overall effect on total cost compared to the core case is small
for limited current storage capacity (e.g., with neutral subsidy and
high eﬃciency total cost increases by 0.2% and with low eﬃciency
it decreases by 0.2%) and for the extreme case of unlimited storage
total cost decreases by 4.9% and increases by 5.6% for high eﬃciency
and low eﬃciency, respectively. Not surprisingly, when eﬃciency is
higher (lower), the optimal storage capacity is also higher (lower),
both for the case of a neutral subsidy and a differentiated subsidy.
In both scenarios, subsidy differentiation reduces total cost by a
similar amount than in the core case and the optimal storage capacity
can be signiﬁcantly reduced compared to a neutral subsidy scheme.
It is interesting to note, that the optimal differentiation depends on
the storage eﬃciency. In the core case, we still observe an optimal
differentiation that reduces the subsidy from solar even if storage
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Fig. 7. Marginal costs and beneﬁts for different levels of energy storage and technology-neutral and technology-speciﬁc RE support schemes.
capacity is unlimited and curtailment is zero. This is because elec-
tricity from solar energy is more likely to go into storage compared
to wind due to its highly concentrated availability pattern. If storage
losses are nonzero this makes solar less valuable than wind and a
small differentiation of the subsidy persists in the optimum. Accord-
ingly, we observe that with a higher storage eﬃciency the optimal
Table 4
Sensitivity analysis.
Neutral Differentiated
Core H. Eff. L. Eff. H. RES Core H. Eff. L. Eff. H. RES
Variable Tech. Storage factora
Total cost [B. EUR] 1 (37.7GWh) 40.8 40.9 40.7 73.8 37.6 37.6 37.8 51.4
5 (188.5GWh) 32.3 32.0 33.2 44.2 31.9 31.4 32.8 39.5
10 (377GWh) 29.9 28.8 31.1 34.3 29.8 28.8 31.0 33.7
Unlim. 28.5 27.1 30.1 30.8 28.5 27.1 30.1 30.8
Curtailment [TWh] Wind 1 (37.7GWh) 46.3 58.9 44.7 115 44.7 43.5 43.7 104
5 (188.5GWh) 12.5 19.9 12.9 45 12.0 13.1 11.7 46
10 (377GWh) 1.8 1.9 2.2 4.3 1.8 2.0 1.5 8.3
Unlim. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PV 1 (37.7GWh) 94.0 84.9 90.6 380 29.2 32.0 32.3 79
5 (188.5GWh) 21.3 18.5 21.8 118 11.5 11.6 12.3 39
10 (377GWh) 3.6 4.2 3.0 31 2.3 2.9 1.7 15
Unlim. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Generation share by technology
(%)b
Wind 1 (37.7GWh) 30.5 28.4 30.6 33.9 39.8 40.4 38.9 50.6
5 (188.5GWh) 27.4 26.5 27.6 29.5 31.3 31.9 31.4 38.8
10 (377GWh) 24.6 24.3 25.5 27.6 26.4 25.8 27.9 31.7
Unlim. 20.1 17.6 22.5 21.9 21.7 18.3 25.0 24.7
PV 1 (37.7GWh) 39.5 41.6 39.4 46.1 30.2 29.6 31.1 29.4
5 (188.5GWh) 42.6 43.5 42.4 50.5 38.7 38.1 38.6 41.2
10 (377GWh) 45.4 45.7 44.5 52.4 43.6 44.2 42.1 48.3
Unlim. 49.9 52.4 47.5 58.1 48.3 51.7 45.0 55.3
Average investment cost
[
EUR
MWh
]
c Wind 1 (37.7GWh) 94.2 102 93.3 133 94.4 93.9 93.8 123
5 (188.5GWh) 74.8 78.6 75.3 93.3 76.0 76.6 76.2 95
10 (377GWh) 67.7 67.2 68.8 70.7 68.6 68.0 69.6 74.6
Unlim. 64.4 62.7 66.1 65.6 65.2 63.0 67.5 67.1
PV 1 (37.7GWh) 84.9 81.4 83.7 180 64.3 65.4 65.4 84.3
5 (188.5GWh) 62.2 61.4 62.4 88.6 58.8 58.6 59.2 67.1
10 (377GWh) 57.9 57.8 57.8 66.0 57.2 57.2 56.9 61.4
Unlim. 58.1 58.2 57.9 60.1 57.7 58.1 57.3 59.4
Subsidy diff. (%)d 1 (37.7GWh) 100 100 100 100 62 62 65 53
5 (188.5GWh) 100 100 100 100 74 72 76 67
10 (377GWh) 100 100 100 100 84 85 81 78
Unlim. 100 100 100 100 91 96 86 90
Optimal storage capacity [GWh] 143 150 123 309 83 98 72 219
a Storage factor denotes storage capacity in multiples of the currently installed capacity (37.7GWh).
b Note that the generation shares always add up to the policy target of 70%.
c Average investment cost is measured in annuitized investment cost per generation net of curtailment.
d We report the percentage value of the subsidy per MWh for PV relative to wind.
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Fig. 8. Seasonal storage patterns for quasi unlimited storage capacity (6786GWh) and ten times the current storage capacity (377GWh).
differentiation for unlimited storage capacity is closer to a neutral
scheme and vice versa for lower eﬃciency. The numerical changes in
differentiation remain small. For unlimited storage, when the effect
is strongest, higher eﬃciency reduces optimal differentiation by 5
percentage points, while lower eﬃciency increases its value by 10
percentage points. For current storage capacities, the difference is
less than 1% for higher eﬃciency and 3% for low eﬃciency.
7. Concluding remarks
The ongoing decarbonization of the electricity sector in many
countries will substantially increase the share of energy supplied
from volatile, intermittent RE sources such as wind and solar. A key
challenge, also for bolstering policy support for the decarboniza-
tion through more renewables, is to achieve the integration of large
amounts of highly volatile generation in electricity markets at mod-
erate costs. Much of the ongoing discussions in both the academic
literature and among policy-makers have focused on how increased
volumes of electricity storage can serve as a buffering mechanism
to cope with market volatility and system integration cost. In light
of large uncertainties about the cost, availability, and potential of
future storage technologies when deployed at large scales, this paper
has examined the suitability of an alternative mechanism for buffer-
ing volatility that is based on modifying the design of RE support
schemes to take into account the heterogeneous value of different RE
technologies in terms of their system integration costs.
To provide a conceptual and empirically-grounded framework for
thinking about the economics of integrating high shares of volatile
RE sources into an electricity market, we have developed a numer-
ical partial equilibrium model of the wholesale electricity market
which resolves output decisions on hourly markets, time-dependent
demand and resource availabilities of wind and the sun, investment
decisions in production capacity, curtailment decisions to maintain
system stability, and a detailed representation of short-term and
longer-term electricity storage. The decentralized market model is
embedded in a welfare-maximizing problem of a benevolent regula-
tor who chooses RE support policies (through subsidies on RE output
which we model as a feed-in premium on top of the market price) in
order to implement an electricity market with a high share of inter-
mittent RE at the lowest cost to society.While we have calibrated the
model to currentmarket conditions of the German electricitymarket,
we believe that the main insights emerging from our analysis largely
carry over to the electricity market context of other countries, too.
Ouranalysisprovides several important insights. First,weﬁnd that
the storage capacity needed to accommodate a high share of intermit-
tentREoutput is relativelymoderate,evenunderatechnology-neutral
RE support scheme. This implies that the potentially high costs of
providing storage at large scale in the future need not jeopardize
the achievement of environmental targets (i.e., the reduction of CO2
emissions through increasing the share of low-carbon renewables).
Second, we ﬁnd that the design of a RE policy can have a signiﬁ-
cant impact on system integration cost as well as storage capacity
needs when there are several intermittent renewable technologies
with heterogeneous availability patterns of the underlying natural
resources (such as wind and solar energy). The smart differentiation
of RE subsidies affects investment patterns in a way which can effec-
tively reduce the curtailment of excess generation, in turn lowering
the need for costly investment in energy storage. We use a simple
cost-beneﬁt framework to show that optimal subsidy differentiation
signiﬁcantly reduces the level of optimal storage. In this sense, con-
cerns about the costs and availability of future storage technologies
to be able to integrate a high share of intermittent RE output in elec-
tricity markets and to achieve environmental goals are even more
diminished if a smart design of RE support policies is chosen. Third,
within our modeling framework which captures high RE shares up to
80% but not a completely decarbonized system, we ﬁnd that the type
of storage most likely needed is short-term to medium-term storage.
The additional beneﬁts from long-termseasonal storage are relatively
modest and most likely much smaller than its investment costs.
The necessary abstraction and assumptions of the electricity mar-
ket model imply that several caveats should be kept in mind when
interpreting our results. Future costs and beneﬁts of RE and storage
technologies are highly uncertain in the present. We therefore make
use of current cost estimates in ourmodel calibration and cost-beneﬁt
analysis and thus cannot and do not aim to predict exact numbers for
future systems. We focus on one policy scheme (a feed-in premium
per MWh of renewable energy produced). There are several other
possibilities of designing RE subsidies, including a subsidy scheme
where the subsidy goes to zerowhenever the electricity price reaches
zero and a subsidy per MW of installed capacity. We leave the role of
technology-differentiation in suchalternativepolicydesigns to future
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research. Our ﬁndings rely on the assumption of ﬁxed renewable
production proﬁles taken from the base year of our simulation which
might not be the best approximation of future proﬁles. Therefore,
we cannot address questions of different predictability of RE tech-
nologies and its implications for optimal subsidy differentiation. The
marginal beneﬁts curve of storage capacity which we construct does
not capture all potential beneﬁts. We focus on the biggest contrib-
utor to system integration cost, curtailment of RE generation, but
storage will also reduce cost originating from stochastic variation of
weather conditions and—if it is organized in smaller decentralized
units—storage can also reduce the need for costly transmission grid
extensions. At the same time, a greater interconnection via transmis-
sion capacities to neighboring markets has the potential to reduce
the marginal beneﬁts from storage investment because it permits
a more eﬃcient use of existing RE capacities and storage capacities
over a larger geographical area. The combined effect on the marginal
beneﬁt curve depends on speciﬁc details of the electricity market
in question and is beyond the scope of this work. The same is true
for additional beneﬁts from ancillary services storage could provide
(see, e.g. Newbery, 2016, for an evaluation of earnings from ancillary
services). We also abstract from complications from natural water
inﬂow that might arise in a system with substantial capacities of
large-scale hydro dams. Our generic storage technology does not
depend on external weather phenomena but in such a real-world
system hydrological constraints could very well interact with inter-
mittency from wind and solar power. These could only be addressed
by a more complex model incorporating the hydrological cycles of
a speciﬁc region which is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly,
an extension of the model could explicitly incorporate demand-side
management as an alternative form of energy storage. This would
require careful modeling of the different types of participants and
system costs.
Our analysis should thus not be viewed as a comprehensive cost-
beneﬁt assessment but rather stresses the point that policy design
greatly matters for minimizing the economic cost of achieving CO2
emissions reductions through integrating large amounts of energy
supply fromcarbon-free but volatile RE technologies.While this point
has been overlooked so far, it should be taken into account when
discussing ways to reduce system integration cost from intermittent
RE. The potential beneﬁts of subsidy differentiationmay also lead the
way to re-thinking futureREpolicydesign in termsof speciﬁc features
of technologies (such as its impact on system stability, interaction
with storage or transmission grids) rather than being technology-
neutral or tailored to each technology individually. One example for
this could be a subsidy for system stability or supply ﬂexibility. We
leave an analysis of such policies for future research. With regard
to future storage needs, we concur with Zerrahn et al. (2018) who
show that the expansion of energy storage capacity will arguably not
constitute a limiting factor to integrate large shares of volatile RE
supply in electricity markets needed to combat climate change.
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